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BANKING AT THE FED WITH FEDACCOUNTS: THE DEMISE
OF COMMERCIAL BANKS?
I. INTRODUCTION
Approximately 32% of the population, or 90.6 million people, do
not have access to traditional banking services in America.1 Within this
population the demographics vary considerably among different racial
and ethnic groups.2 However, certain groups are more likely to be affected than others.3 For example, unbanked and underbanked consumers
are more likely than fully banked consumers to have lower incomes and
be younger, minority, female, unmarried, and unemployed.4
The terms unbanked and underbanked are distinct.5 Unbanked
refers to consumers who have no formal relationship at a bank.6 The underbanked are consumers who have a formal relationship with a mainstream bank but primarily rely on alternative financial institutions for
their banking or credit needs.7
Because mainstream banking excludes this segment of the population from services offered to fully banked consumers, the unbanked and
underbanked are more likely to use alternative financial service providers, a sector of the financial industry often referred to as “fringe

1. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., 2017 NAT’L SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED
HOUSEHOLDS, 1 (2018), available at https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf [hereinafter FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY].
2. See id. at 14–16 (summarizing the issues with this part of the population and conducting statistical studies on the way the group is accessing banking services).
3. See Thecla Fabian, One-Fourth of U.S. Households Are Unbanked, Underbanked,
FDIC Finds, [2010] Banking Daily (BNA), May 6, 2010, https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/bankfinance/document/XAVC87G5GVG0 (discussing the different sectors of the population that is either unbanked or underbanked).
4. Id.
5. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 1.
6. Morgan Ricks, John Crawford & Lev Menand, Central Banking for All: A Public
Option for Bank Accounts, GREAT DEMOCRACY INITIATIVE 3 (2018).
7. Id.
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banking.”8 These alternative financial service providers offer services
such as check cashing, payday lending, and small-dollar loans.9 However, these services are offered at much higher rates than what mainstream banks are offering for the same or similar services.10
To include this underserved population, there is a current proposal outlined in a paper by Morgan Ricks, John Crawford, and Lev Menand11 to let all individuals have access to bank accounts at the Federal
Reserve.12 These accounts are referred to as “FedAccounts.”13
The FedAccounts proposal seeks to make holding a deposit account with the central bank—currently limited only to banking institutions—available to individuals and nonbank businesses.14 This plan
would give every consumer and business access to instantaneous payment transfers, sovereign money, and access to the interest on reserves
rate (“IOR”).15 If implemented, the FedAccounts system would bring
about large monetary-financial change to the United States banking system.16
However, FedAccounts will likely not accomplish an important
goal established in the proposal—fully connecting the unbanked and underbanked population to the banking system.17
Implementing
8. Mehrsa Baradaran, It’s Time for Postal Banking, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 165 (2014),
https://harvardlawreview.org/2014/02/its-time-for-postal-banking (stating that the unbanked
and underbanked population are typically more comfortable with using fringe services).
9. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL
SERVICES 10 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/consumers-and-mobile-financial-services-report-201603.pdf.
10. See John P. Caskey, Bringing Unbanked Households Into the Banking System,
BROOKINGS (Jan. 1, 2002), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/bringing-unbanked-households-into-the-banking-system/ (reviewing the differences between the fringe services and
mainstream banking and how the unbanked group of consumers could be brought into the
banking system).
11. Morgan Ricks is a professor of law at Vanderbilt Law School, and was previously a
senior policy advisor at the U.S. Treasury Department. John Crawford is a professor of law
at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. Lev Menand served as Senior
Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury from 2015 to 2016 and previously worked
for the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions.
12. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
13. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.
14. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3.
15. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2.
16. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–4.
17. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–4 (stating that an obvious benefit
of the FedAccounts program would be financial inclusion for those who are left out of mainstream financial banking services).

2019]

BANKING AT THE FED

453

FedAccounts would also preclude the private sector from opportunities
to include this group of consumers in a more complete way.18 Lastly, the
use of FedAccounts would put unnecessary strain on the banking industry.19
Further, alternatives such as solutions through state banks, postal
banking, and mobile financial services better address the issues that the
unbanked and underbanked population face today.20 Rather than taking
away opportunities for growth from the private banking sector, these alternatives work alongside private institutions to provide certain banking
services to those who are harder to reach.21 What is certain is that the
unbanked and underbanked cannot be left out of mainstream financial
services any longer.22
This Note analyzes the FedAccounts proposal and discusses the
issues and alternatives that would better serve the target population excluded from mainstream banking.23 This Note proceeds in five parts.
Part II details the proposal, defines the unbanked and underbanked population, and analyzes the issues with the limited financial services currently available to them.24 Part III discusses the issues with the proposal
itself.25 Part IV reviews alternative options better suited to meeting the
needs of the unbanked and underbanked.26 Part V summarizes the arguments.27

18. See e.g., Mary Wisniewski, U.S. Bank Launches Payday Loan Alternative for CashStrapped Customers, BANK RATE (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.bankrate.com/banking/usbank-new-short-term-loan (stating U.S. Bank’s new alternative to payday lending).
19. See Greg Robb, Federal Reserve Should Give Everyone Checking Accounts, New
Study Says, MARKET WATCH (May 5, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/fedshould-forget-about-its-own-cryptocurrency-and-instead-create-electronic-bank-accountsfor-everyone-2018-04-30 (explaining some of the risks associated with FedAccounts).
20. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 8 (justifying the proposal of postal banking, an alternative to FedAccounts).
21. See e.g., Baradaran, supra note 8 (emphasizing the benefits of postal banking).
22. Caskey, supra note 10.
23. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1 (discussing the proposal and how
it could possibly fit with the current system).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part V.
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II. THE PROPOSAL AND THE POPULATION AT RISK
A.

What is a FedAccount?

The FedAccount program would give the general public—individuals, businesses, and institutions—the option to open bank accounts
at the Federal Reserve.28 The program claims it will transform the United
States account-money system into a public infrastructure “akin to roads,
sidewalks, public libraries, the judicial system, and law enforcement.”29
FedAccounts would have the functionality of a bank account with “special features.”30 These special features include unlimited secure balances,
instant network payments,31 and higher interest rates.32 The proposal
states that FedAccounts are able to offer these unlimited secure balances
due to the deposit balances being “fully sovereign money” with no possibility of default.33
By stating higher interest rates, the proposal is referring to the
fact that the IOR is currently higher than average deposit accounts at
banking institutions.34 Consumers would be attracted by no-fees and
higher interest on their deposits.35 Business consumers with over
$250,000, exceeding the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”) insurance, would be attracted by the guarantee for their entire
deposit.36
28.
29.
30.
31.

Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.
Payments from the FedAccounts would clear immediately just as interbank payments
clear at the Federal reserve. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–4.
32. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–4 (stating “higher interest rates,”
however these rates are just higher currently when compared to the average deposit account
at banks pay today and have the ability to drop and even go into the negatives).
33. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3 (stating that deposits at the Federal
Reserve would be fully sovereign because they are not lending more than they have such as
banks, therefore insurance would be unnecessary).
34. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM, INTEREST ON REQUIRED RESERVE
BALANCES AND EXCESS BALANCES (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/reqresbalances.htm.
35. See Rebecca Wessell, Checking Account Fees: How Much Are They and How Can
They Be Waived?, https://www.valuepenguin.com/banking/checking-account-fees (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (explaining the price of checking account fees and how they can be a burden
on consumers).
36. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., UNDERSTANDING DEPOSIT INSURANCE (Jan. 2018),
https://www.fdic.gov/deposit/deposits/faq.html.
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FedAccounts are comparable to bank accounts without overdraft
coverage.37 The FedAccounts proposal suggests the program will differentiate itself from most banking institutions by having no fees, minimum
balances, or interchange fees from debit card payments.38 The physical
location to access these FedAccounts is proposed to be at the offices of
the United States Postal Service (“USPS”).39 Further, the FedAccount
program is not a lending program extending credit to consumers.40
The proposal explains that a FedAccount is “a system for payments and accounts: a ledger combined with processes and protocols for
debiting and crediting balances.”41 Among others, the proposed benefits
include financial inclusion and stability, payment speed and efficiency,
and increasing trust in government.42 The proposal claims that there
would be a positive effect on the population from the federal government
having a program working directly for every consumer.43
The proposal states that the most obvious result of FedAccounts
would be financial inclusion, mentioning specifically the unbanked and
underbanked population.44 Because the system is only valuable if there
is massive take up, the proposal authors predict a significant transition to
the FedAccounts due to the incentives associated with them.45 Therefore,
the plan claims to have benefits for all because of a “boost” in interest
payments, or the direct pass-through of the IOR,46 paid by the Federal
Reserve, and immediate payment clearance.47

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 8.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 8.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 3–6.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 12.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6.
The Federal Reserve pays interest on both interest of required reserves (IORR) and
interest on excess reserves, but I combine these in referring to the IOR because there required
reserves are only a small portion of the total. Further the FedAccount authors refer to the IOR
throughout. See Thomas L. Hogan, Bank Lending and Interest on Excess Reserves, Rice
University Baker Institute for Public Policy, https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/3173032e/workingpaper-banklending-020718.pdf (explaining the effect of IOR
on bank lending).
47. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 1–2.
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IOR is a fairly recent implementation by the Federal Reserve to
give interest to banks of their central bank accounts.48 Congress granted
this power to the Federal Reserve in the Financial Services Regulatory
Relief Act of 2006, but it was not used until the financial crisis in 2008.49
This interest rate payment is used along with other tools to implement
monetary policy.50
The IOR is the rate at which the Federal Reserve pays interest on
reserve balances.51 Reserve balances are held at the Federal Reserve and
are retained by banks to transfer large payments to other financial institutions.52 The Federal Reserve created IOR in order to enable it to control
short-term interest rates, broadening government control over the lending
market.53
Another tool used to control monetary policy is the federal funds
rate.54 The federal funds rate is the rate at which banks lend their reserve
balances to other banks on an overnight basis.55 The Federal Open Market Committee (“FOMC”) sets this rate and uses open market operations,
the selling of government securities, to influence the money supply and
meet the set target rate.56 The Federal Reserve sets a ceiling for the federal funds rate with a discount rate, the amount that the Federal Reserve
charges banks that borrow from the discount window.57 Conversely, the

48. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., WHY DID THE FEDERAL RESERVE START PAYING
INTEREST ON RESERVE BALANCES HELD ON DEPOSIT AT THE FED? DOES THE FED PAY INTEREST
ON REQUIRED RESERVES, EXCESS RESERVES, OR BOTH? WHAT INTEREST RATE DOES THE FED
PAY? (2013), https://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-econ/2013/march/federalreserve-interest-balances-reserves/.
49. Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, 109th Cong. § 201 (2006).
50. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., supra note 48.
51. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF S.F., supra note 48.
52. Kimberly Amadeo, How Does the Fed Raise or Lower Interest Rates, BALANCE (Nov.
27, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/how-does-the-fed-raise-or-lower-interest-rates3306127.
53. See FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK, FEDERAL FUND AND INTEREST ON
RESERVES (2013), https://www.newyorkfed.org/aboutthefed/fedpoint/fed15.html (explaining
the purpose of IOR).
54. Kimberly Amadeo, Fed Funds Rate, Its Impact, and How it Works, BALANCE (last
updated Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/fed-funds-rate-definition-impact-andhow-it-works-3306122.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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IOR sets a floor for the federal funds rate because banks will not lend
money at an interest rate lower than the rate received on reserves.58
Without IOR, the Federal Reserve would control monetary policy
by quickly selling its asset holdings.59 This was how the FOMC implemented monetary policy prior to 2008 and was able to do so until the
financial crisis.60 Many other central banks use this IOR rate to control
short-term market rates.61
Because the banks obtain interest on the excess reserves, they will
not lend to another bank at lower interest rates than they could obtain by
leaving the funds on deposit at the regional Federal Reserve bank.62 The
rise in IOR policy is estimated by one study to account for a 61.3% decline in consumer bank lending post-2008.63 The FedAccounts proposal
raises the concern that the IOR is not passing directly through to consumers but is instead acting as a subsidy to banks.64 By “paying” these banks
to operate, the proposal asserts that banks are no longer deserving of their
subsidy when a large part of the population is left out from the services
offered.65
Lastly, the proposal asserts that if there is a large transition to
FedAccounts, it will lead to large-scale stability in the financial markets.66 This stability comes from an increase in monetary control through
the Federal Reserve’s ability to change interest rates that would directly
affect consumers.67 The proposal claims that all of these benefits combined would ultimately lead to a greater trust in the federal government
by consumers.68

58. Id.
59. Ben S. Bernanke & Donald Kohn, The Fed’s Interest Payments to the Bank,

BROOKINGS (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ben-bernanke/2016/02/16/thefeds-interest-payments-to-banks/.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Michael Ng & David Wessel, The Hutchins Center Explains: How the Powell Fed
Will Raise Interest Rates, BROOKINGS (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/upfront/2018/03/15/the-hutchins-center-explains-how-the-powell-fed-will-raise-interest-rates/.
63. Hogan, supra note 46.
64. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6.
65. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 6.
66. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2.
67. See Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59 (explaining how the Federal Reserve’s interest
payments to banks implements monetary policy).
68. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 2.
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The Population at Risk

The population faced with the challenge of being unbanked or
underbanked varies across the United States population.69 However, the
probability of being unbanked or underbanked is higher among lowerincome, black and Hispanic, working-age disabled, low-education, and
younger households.70 Nearly half of people between eighteen and
twenty-four years of age are unbanked.71
Collectively, these households spend about $89 billion on interest
and fees for fringe services such as payday loans and check cashing services, averaging at $2,412 per household.72 One in six unbanked households have used a payday loan, but this drops to one in twenty among
fully banked households.73 A recent study shows that over half the population of the United States would not be able to access $2,000 in thirty
days to respond to an emergency.74
The most frequently reported reason for not having a bank account among the unbanked and underbanked population is the belief that
they do not have enough money to keep in a bank account.75 Indeed,
checking accounts with the lowest monthly fees or minimums to waive
monthly fees are rare for these consumer profiles, and such consumers
who gain access usually do not earn interest on their deposits.76 In 2018,
Bank of America announced it was no longer going to offer free
69.
70.
71.
72.

FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 70.
FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 70.
FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE U.S. POSTAL SERV., PROVING NON-BANK FINANCIAL
SERVICES FOR THE UNDERSERVED (Jan. 27, 2014), https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-14-007_0.pdf
[hereinafter
INSPECTOR
GENERAL USPS REPORT].
73. See Timothy Bates & Constance R. Dunham, Introduction to Focus Issue: Use of
Financial Services by Low-Income Households, 17(2) ECON. DEV. QUARTERLY 3–7 (2003);
see also Matt Fellowes & Mia Mabanta, Banking on Wealth: America’s New Retail Banking
Infrastructure and Its Wealth-Building Potential, BROOKINGS (Jan. 22, 2008),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/banking-on-wealth-americas-new-retail-banking-infrastructure-and-its-wealth-building-potential/.
74. See An Examination of the Availability of Credit for Consumers: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 141
n.1
(2011),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg72606/pdf/CHRG112hhrg72606.pdf (explaining the statement of Robert W. Mooney, Deputy Director, Consumer Protection and Community Affairs).
75. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 3.
76. See generally Wessell, supra note 35.
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“eBanking” checking accounts and will now charge a $12 monthly fee.77
The only way to avoid this fee is to have a monthly direct deposit of at
least $250, maintain a $1,500 daily balance, or be younger than twentyfour years old.78 These scenarios are likely why 55.8% of unbanked consumers responded in a FDIC survey that banks are “not at all interested”
in serving consumers like themselves.79
Other studies have found that these consumers often have a negative experience which results in a mistrust of banks or they find alternative fringe banking services to be more convenient.80 Because of this
opportunity in the market, payday lenders are seeking out the unbanked
and underbanked population.81 There are more payday lending and
check-cashing outlets in the United States than McDonald’s locations.82
Many mainstream banks do not seek out this part of the population due to their low deposit balance, leaving a hole that payday lenders
can fill.83 Some large banks have even closed branches in low-income
communities with the largest percentages of unbanked Americans.84
However, even though this population might lack access in some areas,
the unbanked and underbanked are more likely to use fringe financial services even if they are in the same neighborhood as mainstream financial
institutions.85

77. Lisa Joyce, Bank of America and the End of Free Checking, FINANCIAL BRAND (Jan.
29, 2018), https://thefinancialbrand.com/70145/bank-of-america-free-checking/.
78. Id.
79. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 3.
80. FED. RESERVE BANK OF KAN. CITY, UNBANKED AND UNDERBANKED CONSUMERS IN
THE 10TH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT (2010), https://www.kansascityfed.org/~/media/files/publicat/research/community/unbankedexecutivesummary.pdf.
81. See Caskey, supra note 10.
82. Stacy Cowley, Payday Lending Faces Tough New Restrictions by Consumer Agency,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/business/payday-loanscfpb.html.
83. Nelson D. Schwartz, Banks Closings Tilt Toward Poor Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22,
2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/business/23banks.html.
84. See, e.g., id. (“[For the] first time in 15 years, more bank branches have closed than
opened across the United States”).
85. Fellows & Mabanta, supra note 73.
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Fringe Banking Services

The fringe banking industry is fairly new within the United
States. Three decades ago it was almost nonexistent, but today it brings
in tens of billions of dollars in revenue each year.87 This growth was
triggered in the 1970s, when states began to raise interest rates or loosen
restrictions on interest rate ceilings.88 As smaller, local institutions that
typically met the needs of the small-dollar loan market began to merge
with larger banks, it reduced the availability of the services offered to the
lower income population.89 This new market introduced fringe banking
to an attractive consumer who would be willing to pay a high interest rate
for a small amount of money, the unbanked and underbanked.90
Greater consumer access to mainstream financial institutions has
long been discussed by policymakers.91 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) has listed this problem along with the increasing
use of fringe banking as a top priority issue.92 It is problematic for the
unbanked and underbanked population to operate on a cash-only basis in
today’s financial marketplace without the ability to receive direct deposits and pay bills online.93 Further, short term fringe services providing
86

86. See Jerzy Eisenberg-Guyot, Caislin Firth, Marieka Klawitter & Anjum Hajat, From
Payday Loans to Pawnshops: Fringe Banking, the Unbanked, and Health, 37 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 3, (2018), https://content.healthaffairs.org/doi/full/10.1377/hlthaff.2017.1219, (connecting the unbanked population and their access to fringe banking with associated health
issues).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Mehrsa Baradaran, How the Poor Got Cut Out of Banking. 62 EMORY LAW L.J. 483,
483–548 (2013).
90. See GARY RIVLIN, BROKE, USA: FROM PAWNSHOPS TO POVERTY, INC.—HOW THE
WORKING POOR BECAME BIG BUSINESS, 41–43 (2010) (discussing how widespread the fringe
banking services are and discussing how they impact communities).
91. CONSUMERS AND MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES, supra note 9.
92. See ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC INCLUSION, FED. DEPOSIT INS.
CORP. http://www.fdic.gov/about/comein (outlining the Committee’s ongoing initiatives to
expand access to underserved populations); see also Kelly Thompson Cochran, FALL 2013
RULEMAKING AGENDA, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU (Dec. 3, 2013) (discussing the
how the Dodd-Frank Act requirements were implemented to preserve credit in “rural or underserved areas”).
93. See FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1 (discussing the difficulties the unbanked
population faces and what needs to be done to fix these issues).
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credit to these consumers may charge interest at annual percentage rates
of up to 400-600%.94
Although there are currently some regulations on predatory lenders and proposed legislation to restrict them further, regulation has yet to
bring banking solutions to the unbanked and underbanked population.95
Mick Mulvaney, then Acting Director of the CFPB, announced in January of 2018 that the CFPB would revise payday lending regulations enacted during the Obama Administration are to come into effect on August
19, 2019.96 The CFPB recently announced on February 6, 2019 they plan
to rescind97 the mandatory provisions of the Payday Lending Rule promulgated in November of 2017.98 Any revision, even under the new Acting
Director Kathy Kraninger, will presumably be more favorable to payday
lenders than the original regulation.99
Even if there were a regulation heavily restricting payday lenders,
if payday lenders are restricted and removed from the current market
there is concern that the unbanked and underbanked will be even further
left out of the lending market.100 Therefore, rather than having access to

94. Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and
Demographic Realities in Title Lending, MO. L. REV. 41, 46 (2012).
95. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 876
(2007) (discussing payday lending and how highly visible providers are better for consumers
than smaller one shop lenders).
96. The Regulatory Future of Payday Lending, PYMNTS.COM (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://www.pymnts.com/news/alternative-financial-services/2018/payday-lending-shortterm-loans-regulations-cfpb/.
97. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection proposed to rescind sections of the
“Payday, Vehicles Title, and certain High-Cost Installment Loans,” specifically (1) provide
that it is an unfair and abusive practice for a lender to make a covered short-term or longerterm balloon-payment loan, including payday and vehicle title loans, without reasonably determining that consumers have the ability to repay those loans according to their terms; (2)
prescribe mandatory underwriting requirements for making the ability-to-repay determination; (3) exempt certain loans from the underwriting requirements; and (4) establish related
definitions, reporting, and recordkeeping requirements. See RULES UNDER DEVELOPMENT,
CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, (last viewed Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development/payday-vehicletitle-and-certain-high-cost-installment-loans/.
98. Id.
99. See Stacey Coley, Mulvaney Sides with Payday Lenders Asking Court to Block Restrictions, N.Y. TIMES (June 5, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/05/business/cfpbpayday-lenders-mulvaney.html (discussing Mulvaney’s attempt to block the payday lending
restrictions in a joint motion in federal court).
100. Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95.
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some lenders, even though they offer services at extremely high rates, the
unbanked and underbanked would be lacking any resource at all.101
Although the FedAccounts proposal does not plan to offer lending, this part of the population lacks access to this important economic
resource.102 Further, the proposal will likely put stress on the banking
institutions’ lending markets.103 This will likely only facilitate fringe
banking services and predatory lending practices.104
III. ISSUES WITH THE PROPOSALS
The FedAccounts proposal claims that it is “remarkable” how
many problems it would mitigate or solve through its implementation.105
Although some positive effects would likely come from the program—
including no interchange fees and real-time payment—there are likely
more substantial issues that the proposal would induce if implemented as
planned.106 Not only would this proposal unnecessarily strain the banking industry by removing a large amount of deposits from banks, but the
population of the unbanked and underbanked would likely not benefit as
much as predicted from the implementation of the FedAccounts proposal.107
A.

Government Intervention

Government involvement and ownership of banks is widespread
around the world, especially in countries with low levels of per capita
income and undeveloped financial systems.108 However, one study has
found that government ownership of banks is connected to slower development of the financial system, lower economic growth, and lower

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.C.
Mann & Hawkins, supra note 95, at 876.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
See Caskey, supra note 10.
See Caskey, supra note 10; Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government
Ownership of Banks (Harv. Univ., Working Paper No. 01-016, 2000),
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.236434.
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productivity growth.109 Another study suggests that once government
banks undertake “political interference,” their financial performance deteriorates.110 These theories suggest that when the government is in control of banks, or when consumers have accounts at the Federal Reserve,
the lending decisions become driven by politics rather than economics
and will further lead to slowing economic growth.111
The regional Federal Reserve Banks are owned by national banks
or state-chartered member banks in their region.112 The mass migration
to the Federal Reserve banks addressed in the proposal would deprive
these private banks of a large part of their deposits.113 Therefore, bringing
about this large change would be difficult without a different ownership
structure.114
The proposal addresses this issue by claiming the broad migration
to the FedAccounts would require the Federal Reserve to extend “discount window loans to offset banks’ lost deposit balance.”115 Accordingly, the Federal Reserve would be paying depositors between 22.50%—the IOR rate current to this writing—and then using those funds
to loan back to banks at 2.75%—the discount rate current to this writing—for a spread of fifty to seventy-five basis points as profit.116 This
differs from the current rate of .05% to .08% that banks currently receive,
a much costlier source of funding.117
The proposal further states that this will “insulate[] the central
bank’s investment function from the appearance or reality of political
109. Id. at 6–7.
110. Chung-Hua Shen & Chih-Yung Lin, Why Government Banks Underperform: A Po-

litical Interference View, 21 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 181 (2012).
111. Mark A. Calabria, Public Banking Hurts Economics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2013),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/01/should-states-operate-publicbanks/public-banking-hurts-economic.
112. FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, WHO OWNS RESERVE BANKS, https://www.stlouisfed.org/in-plain-english/who-owns-the-federal-reserve-banks (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
113. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 7.
114. See WHO OWNS RESERVE BANKS, supra note 112 (stating that the Federal Reserve
has stock that is owned by commercial banks).
115. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
116. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYSTEM, POLICY TOOLS: OPEN MARKET
OPERATIONS, (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/openmarket.htm.
117. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYSTEM, POLICY TOOLS: THE DISCOUNT
RATE (last updated Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/discountrate.htm.
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meddling or favoritism.”118 Consumers on a mass scale do not entirely
understand what the Federal Reserve does, and public trust in the Federal
Reserve is at a historic low.119 The Federal Reserve is designed to be
politically independent.120 With this goal in mind, the institution was created to be accountable to the public, the Federal Open Market Committee,
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve by implementing
monetary policies that are meant to achieve long-term macroeconomic
objectives.121 However, the President of the United States appoints the
Federal Reserve chair.122 Although the appointment process is not inherently motivated by politics, history shows that it can be.123 During his
1972 campaign, President Nixon encouraged his elected Federal Reserve
chair to employ monetary stimulus to cause a booming economy.124 In
the short-term, there was no issue.125 However, in the long term this led
to global inflation and brought an end to fixed exchange rates.126
Further, the Federal Reserve has received criticism by the current
United States President, Donald J. Trump.127 These comments128 broke
118. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
119. Marth C. White, Nobody Really Knows What the Fed Does, but They Think It’s Bad

Anyway, NBC NEWS (July 25, 2017, 7:30 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/nobody-really-knows-what-fed-does-they-think-it-s-n786091.
120. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED RESERVE SYSTEM, FAQS ABOUT THE FED, (last updated
Dec. 6, 2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs.htm.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See Kenneth Rogoff, Is the Federal Reserve Playing Politics, GUARDIAN (Oct. 3,
2016), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/oct/03/federal-reserve-playing-politicsjanet-yellen-central-banks-us-government (explaining the historical long term effects of the
Federal Reserve Chair’s, Arthur Burns, decisions on monetary policy that were politically
influenced).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See David J. Lynch, Trump Criticizes Federal Reserve, Breaking Long-standing
Practice, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2018/07/19/trump-criticizes-federal-reserve-breaking-long-standing-practice/?utm_term=.723de0022379 (covering Trump’s comments about the Federal Reserve and
explaining the reasoning behind the silence of past presidents on the subject).
128. See e.g., @realdonaldtrump, TWITTER (Dec. 18, 2018, 4:13 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1075001077576151041?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1075001077576151041&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2Fpolicyand-politics%2F2018%2F12%2F17%2F18144497%2Ftrump-tweet-fed-reserve-jay-powell
(“I hope the people over at the Fed will read today’s Wall Street Journal Editorial before they
make yet another mistake. Also, don’t let the market become any more illiquid than it already
is. Stop with the 50 B’s. Feel the market, don’t just go by meaningless numbers. Good luck!”).
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a long time presidential norm followed since the Clinton administration,
that the President declines to comment on the monetary policy decisions
of the Federal Reserve to avoid political influence.129 The risk of political
influence on a federal agency so integral to the economy is concerning,
especially with attempts to expand this influence by giving FedAccounts
to the public.130
Studies show that when central banks can conduct monetary policy operations free of political pressure, the economy observes better inflation rates.131 A risk of this influence on the market is an acceleration
of inflation.132 Economists have expressed concern about the Federal Reserve needing to reduce the size of its balance sheet as banks decrease its
reserves and increase lending.133 This proposal will prevent the Federal
Reserve from reducing its balance sheet and will have the immediate impact of increasing security purchases.134
Policymakers must take a long-term perspective, rather than a
short-term perspective that may be politically motivated, to successfully
implement proper policy efforts that work to stabilize prices and increase
employment.135 Political influence on the powerful Federal Reserve,
only increased through FedAccount control, could lead to a less productive economy and even lead to economic failure overall.136

129. See Lynch, supra note 127 (covering Trump’s comments about the Federal Reserve
and explaining the reasoning behind past president’s silence on the subject).
130. Richard X. Bove, Dick Bove: Trump Will Eventually Clash with the Federal Reserve,
Turning Monetary Policy into a Political Activity, CNBC (July 3, 2018, 12:03 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/07/02/dick-bove-trump-will-eventually-clash-with-the-federalreserve.html.
131. BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., THE FED - WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE
FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE? (Mar. 1,
2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/why-is-it-important-to-separate-federal-reservemonetary-policy-decisions-from-political-influence.htm.
132. Charles W. Calomiris, Learning from the Fed’s QE Experiment, FORBES (Jan 5. 2016,
9:48 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlescalomiris/2016/01/05/federalreserveqelessons/#dd6466e74e24.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS
FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE, supra note 131.
136. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS
FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE, supra note 131.
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Mainstream banks provide inclusive financial services to consumers in other countries without consumers banking at central banks.137
For example, Canada has accomplished a consumer inclusion rate of
99%.138 The FedAccount proposal states that Canadian banks are required to open accounts to all with proper identification and a credit history void of fraud.139 Further, there is regulation of the large banks by
the government to offer low-fee accounts. Although, interestingly, the
inclusion rate was just as high in 2001 prior to these regulations.140
A Canadian economist suggests two major differences that could
be the reason for the large gap in percent of the unbanked and underbanked in the two countries: culture and poverty rates.141 However,
the United States differs only by a few percentage points with a 17% poverty rate compared to Canada’s 12%.142 The author also suggests that it
could be a supply issue as well with the ability of Canadian banks to historically set up extensive banking networks.143 Without a large change
to the United States banking system and regulations, there is little chance
that the unbanked and underbanked issues could be solved in the way that
Canada has done.144
Further, unbanked consumers in the United States cite their lack
of trust in banks and low income as reasons for not holding an account.145
Therefore, rather than access to accounts or interest rates, there are likely
more reasons than FedAccounts addresses for the United States’ unbanked and underbanked population being left out of the mainstream financial system.146

137. WHY IS IT IMPORTANT TO SEPARATE FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY POLICY DECISIONS
FROM POLITICAL INFLUENCE, supra note 131.
138. J.P. Koning, Central Banking for the Unbanked?, AM. INST. ECON. RES. (Aug. 28,
2018), https://www.aier.org/article/sound-money-project/central-banking-unbanked.
139. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4.
140. Koning, supra note 138.
141. Koning, supra note 138.
142. CITIZENS FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE, POVERTY TRENDS 2017, https://www.cpj.ca/sites/default/files/docs/files/PovertyTrendsReport2017.pdf.
143. Koning, supra note 138.
144. Koning, supra note 138.
145. FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY, supra note 1, at 4.
146. See Koning, supra note 138 (stating that high rates of poverty and a mistrust in the
system is a main reason for unbanked Americans not possessing bank accounts).
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FedAccounts would take the opportunity to reach this part of the
population from the private sector.147 There are areas of the private sector, even outside mainstream banking, that are currently making efforts
to offer free deposit accounts and alternatives to payday loans.148 Although many mainstream banks have been reluctant to enter this market,
some private financial services are taking action to reach out to these
consumers.149 More than 70% of online banks—an emerging banking
service in the financial markets—offer free checking accounts.150
For example, U.S. Bank is set to offer a small-dollar alternative
to payday loans.151 On September 10, 2018, the U.S. Bank announced
that it would allow existing checking account customers to borrow between $100 and $1,000 for three months.152 The program is called the
“Simple Loan” and U.S. Bank maintains its loans are more affordable
than payday loans.153 For some consumers, especially the unbanked and
underbanked, this is the best option for small-dollar loans.154
The U.S. Bank announcement came after a push from the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency in late 2017 for banks to find ways to
compete against the payday lending industry.155 At first, there were no
banks interested in entering the market.156 However, it seems that mainstream banks have since recognized the opportunity in the market.157
Only 29% of Americans have an emergency fund.158 This new loan program from U.S. Bank, along with the availability of free deposit accounts,
would not only solve the depositing issue but the credit issue as well,
which FedAccounts does not address.159

147. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6 (stating that the plan is to dramatically
decrease the private banking industry).
148. See Wisniewski, supra note 18 (explaining a bank’s new option to give customers a
“Simple Loan”, a small dollar credit option that will compete with payday lenders).
149. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
150. Joyce, supra note 77.
151. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
152. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
153. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
154. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
155. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
156. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
157. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
158. Wisniewski, supra note 18.
159. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4.
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Lastly, the Federal Reserve would have to implement programs,
such as ATM cards, and customer service efforts in the attempt to offer
bank accounts to everyone.160 The administration of mass consumer accounts would take time to implement when there are already other private
and even public financial institutions that are better equipped to do so.161
The FedAccounts program would decrease the profits and therefore the
overall size of banking institutions leading to less bank branches.162
There is an essential place in the United States market for commercial banks.163 Governments do not have the same incentives to spur
economic development as do private entities.164 Government assistance
is useful to assist in providing services for this part of the populations.165
A better system is one that works with private banks rather than against
them.166 If the Federal Reserve creates bank accounts for all consumers,
they will be replacing a function that could be conducted by commercial
entities.167
B.

Consumer Access to IOR

The proposal further suggests that all accounts at the Federal Reserve receive the same IOR that banks have on their Federal Reserve accounts.168 The proposal states that the Federal Reserve will exhibit
greater monetary control and policy through a direct pass of policy rates
to a large amount of deposit account holders.169 Therefore, the Federal

160. Ng & Wessel, supra note 62.
161. See Baradaran, supra note 8 (explaining that post offices already offer services such

as ATM cards that would reduce the abrupt administrative changes required to offer these
services).
162. WHO OWNS RESERVE BANKS, supra note 112.
163. Anthony Gambardella, Bank on it: Industry Volatility will Decrease as the Industry’s
Business Model Changes, IBISWORLD (Dec. 2018), https://www.ibisworld.com/industrytrends/market-research-reports/finance-insurance/credit-intermediation-related-activities/commercial-banking.html.
164. See Laura Alix, The Risks and Rewards of Banking the Government, AM. BANKER,
Aug. 15, 2017, 4:02 PM, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/the-risks-and-rewards-ofbanking-the-government.
165. Baradaran, supra note 8.
166. Baradaran, supra note 8.
167. See Alix, supra note 164 (describing the risks and rewards of government banking).
168. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
169. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
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Reserve would have their primary tool for controlling monetary policy
directly on every account at the Federal Reserve.170
While the report references “high-interest rates,” these interest
rates are just currently higher than what banks are giving for their deposit
accounts.171 While the IOR rate is currently at 2.20 %, the FOMC might
just lower the IOR rate if there is a mass transition to the Federal Reserve
deposit accounts.172 There is no guarantee that IOR will stay higher than
bank deposit rates or even be permanently paid through the Federal Reserve.173 The FOMC committed to remove IOR in the future after it accomplishes economic stabilization.174 The Federal Reserve would also
be able to exhibit monetary policy tactics on these accounts, opening the
door for possible negative interest rates to increase the money supply in
the marketplace.175
Adding excess reserves to the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet
would either cause a massive increase in the amount of IOR paid out or
decrease the IOR to lower the cost of paying interest.176 Interfering with
such a new, and even controversial, monetary policy tool such as IOR is
a risky proposition.177 If IOR were to dissipate or substantially decrease
too quickly, banks would try to lend their excess reserves excessively,
possibly collapsing short-term interest rates.178

170. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 4–5.
171. See FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, HOW MONETARY POLICY WORKS, https://www.stlou-

isfed.org/in-plain-english/how-monetary-policy-works (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
172. INTEREST ON REQUIRED RESERVE BALANCES AND EXCESS BALANCES, supra note 34.
173. Norbert Michael, Risks from Fed’s Interest on Reserves Threaten More than Monetary Policy, FORBES (Apr. 6, 2015, 7:12 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/norbertmichel/2015/04/06/risks-from-feds-interest-on-reserves-threaten-more-than-monetarypolicy/#32ee08a51b94.
174. FOMC COMMUNICATION RELATED TO POLICY NORMALIZATION, BD. GOVERNORS OF
THE FED. RESERVE SYSTEM (last updated Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/policy-normalization.htm.
175. See Oliver Garret & Stephen McBride, Why We Could Get Negative Interest Rates
Even
Though
The
Fed
is
Hiking,
FORBES
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviergarret/2017/04/03/why-we-could-get-negative-interestrates-even-though-the-fed-is-hiking/#107079aa499c (stating that because of high inflation,
even though the Federal Reserve is actually raising rates, there could be negative interest
rates).
176. Is the Federal Reserve Giving Banks a $12bn Subsidy?, ECONOMIST (Mar. 18, 2017),
https://www.economist.com/finance-and-economics/2017/03/18/is-the-federal-reserve-giving-banks-a-12bn-subsidy.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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While the FedAccounts proposal may attempt financial inclusion
through passing IOR rates to all consumers, overall it seems as if it is a
disapproval of the current IOR policy.179 Therefore, it would still be a
concern that if policymakers implemented this plan, it will not likely
reach consumers any more than the current market can do.180
C.

Lending

Allowing private individuals to bank at the Federal Reserve
would blur the line between commercial banks and the central bank.181
Because of the instantaneous payment clearing and no minimum deposit
that FedAccounts offer, the authors assume that take-up in the program
would be robust.182 One significant consequence of this proposal is the
effect of the availability of lending and overall increase in lending costs
to businesses and consumers.
The business practice of mainstream financial banking services is
taking in consumer deposits and offering loans.183 Banks offer these deposits to the public as “risk-free” holding accounts backed by the FDIC
insurance.184 To pay interest and provide services, such as check clearing, banks need to use deposits to make money.185 Lending money to
consumers for residential mortgages or personal financing comes with
risk, sometimes high risks.186 Banks often offset these risks by diversifying their loans, qualifying borrowers, and taking collateral.187 This is
an imperfect business model but is essential to the market to provide
loans, encouraging economic development.188

179. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6.
180. Josh Galper, CCP Deposits at the Fed: Good Theory but Bad Practice, FINADIUM

(Nov. 30, 2016), https://finadium.com/ccp-deposits-at-the-fed-good-theory-but-bad-practice/.
181. Id.
182. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
183. Ng & Wessel, supra note 62.
184. Matt Levine, Fed Rejects Bank for Being Too Safe, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 6, 2018),
https://www.bloombergquint.com/view/fed-rejects-bank-for-being-too-safe#gs.hj0g=kM.
185. Justin Pritchard, How Banks and Credit Unions Make Money, THE BALANCE (Nov.
2, 2018), https://www.thebalance.com/how-banks-make-money-315473.
186. Levine, supra note 184.
187. Levine, supra note 184.
188. Levine, supra note 184.
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The proposal—along with some economists—refer to IOR as a
subsidy.189 However, mainstream banks cannot profit as easily as the
proposal suggests just by borrowing reserves and then depositing to obtain IOR.190 If this were the case, banks would likely replace deposits
and then use reserves to fund loans bearing higher interest rate income
than IOR offers.191 Alternative institutions do not bear costs such as premiums paid to the FDIC which burden mainstream banks.192
The proposal clearly does not envision FedAccounts as a means
of directly providing credit to account holders.193 The proposal brings up
the possibility that with its enactment it could increase the costs of credit
by removing subsidies through taking away the interest rate exclusive to
banks at the Federal Reserve.194 The proposal states that this would be a
positive effect because it would make the lending market more competitive.195 However, because of the increased costs of funding mentioned
above with the discount window loans, interest rates on the loans banks
will make will likely go up as well.196 The downside for consumers and
businesses will be an increased cost of credit.197
Mainstream banking will not be encouraged to reach out and provide loans to the unbanked and underbanked population.198 Making the
lending market more exclusive and competitive will make low-income
credit seekers even less attractive to banks with the decrease in available
lending.199 Lending would become a privilege only to those institutions
that are able to pay extremely high-interest rates to attract consumers.200
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59.
Bernanke & Kohn, supra note 59.
Levine, supra note 184.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
Baradaran, supra note 89.
Baradaran, supra note 89.
See Casey Hynes, How Social Media Could Help The Unbanked Land a Loan,
FORBES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/chynes/2017/04/25/how-data-willhelp-drive-universal-financial-access/#7c27adb057e6 (exploring the value of using non-traditional data to make credit decisions and the effort banks are or should be making to capture
the business of the unbanked population).
199. Milton Ezrati, Competition Between Banks and Alternative Lenders: The Public
Wins, FORBES (June 15, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/miltonezrati/2018/06/15/competition-between-banks-and-alternative-lenders-the-public-wins/#4df9a5c2bf26.
200. Id.
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The unbanked and underbanked benefit the least out of this aspect of the
proposal and financial inclusion would stay the same or even become
worse.201
IV. ALTERNATIVES
A.

Postal Banking

In 2014, the USPS released a report that argued it was capable of
offering financial services to mend the unbanked and underbanked issue.202 The USPS could be utilized as a unique outlet to provide that
access to financial services as certain consumers’ alternative to large financial institutions.203 This is promoted to the banking industry as noncompetitive because most of these consumers would be mostly outside of
their typical target consumer.204
The FedAccounts proposal mentions the use of the USPS as a
physical location for FedAccounts’ services.205 However, postal banking
differs from the FedAccounts proposal by offering the small dollar lending important to the unbanked and underbanked population.206 The
agency already has in place many of the administrative functions that the
FedAccounts proposal would require of the Federal Reserve.207 Further,
many unbanked and underbanked consumers already use these financial
services provided at USPS, such as money orders.208
There has been growing discussion around the concept of postal
banking.209 Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY) recently proposed

201. Stephen D. Williamson, Interest Rate Control is More Complicated Than You
Thought, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Apr. 2016), https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/regional-economist/april-2016/interest-rate-control-is-more-complicated-than-youthought.
202. Baradaran, supra note 8.
203. Baradaran, supra note 8.
204. Baradaran, supra note 8.
205. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
206. Baradaran, supra note 8.
207. U.S. POSTAL SERV., PROVIDING NON-BANK FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE
UNDERSERVED
(2014), http://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-libraryfiles/2014/rarc-wp-14-007.pdf.
208. Id.
209. Baradaran, supra note 8.
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legislation that would add consumer financial services to USPS.210 The
idea of postal banking has also gained the support of Senators Bernie
Sanders (I-VT) and Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and the USPS Inspector
General.211 Further, Mehrsa Baradaran, a national authority on postal
banking and the author of How the Other Half Banks, advised Senator
Gillibrand on crafting the proposed legislation.212
The postal banking proposal would require USPS to offer basic
banking services to consumers such as savings accounts, debit cards, and
even simple loans.213 The legislation claims to be a straightforward solution to reach the unbanked and underbanked population and replace the
need to resort to fringe banking services.214 USPS claims to be able to
provide the services offered by fringe banking and even mainstream
banking at a lower price.215 For example, USPS suggests that it can offer
a $375 loan with interest and fees totaling $48, compared to a fee of $520
for the average payday lender.216
Postal banking is common and often successful in other countries.217 According to the United Nations’ Universal Postal Union, 183
national postal services offer some financial services.218 Further, eightyseven of them provide checking and savings accounts.219 Currently, the

210. Jordan Weissman, Kirsten Gillibrand Unveils Her Ambitious Plan to Turn the Post
Office Into a Bank, SLATE (July 30, 2018), https://slate.com/business/2018/04/kirsten-gillibrands-ambitious-postal-banking-bill.html.
211. Daniel Marans, Kirsten Gillibrand Unveils a Public Option for Banking,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2018), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/kirsten-gillibrandpostal-banking-bill_us_5ae07f9fe4b07be4d4c6feae.
212. Weissman, supra note 210.
213. David Dayen, The Post Office Should Just Become a Bank, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28,
2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/116374/postal-service-banking-how-usps-can-saveitself-and-help-poor.
214. See Weissman, supra note 2010 (suggesting that the main goal of the bill is to replace
risky financial products with regulated alternatives).
215. U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note 207.
216. U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note 207.
217. See Weissman, supra note 210 (stating that Britain, New Zealand, Japan, and China
have postal banking).
218. Weissman, supra note 210.
219. See Nils Clotteau & Bsrat Measho, Global Panorama on Postal Financial Inclusion,
UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (2016), http://www.upu.int/uploads/tx_sbdownloader/globalPanoramaOnPostalFinancialInclusion2016En.pdf (discussing the opportunity for postal banking
on a global scale and how that change would include the financially excluded parts of the
population).
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USPS has 30,000 locations, of which 59% are in “banking desserts,” or
zip codes that have just one bank branch or no bank branches at all.220
Postal banking is also not a revolutionary concept, as it has a
strong historical background in the United States.221 In 1910, the United
States government established The Postal Savings System and allowed
Americans to have a deposit at the post office.222 At the time, these accounts offered a 2% interest rate.223 From 1911 to 1967, the USPS offered savings and deposit services.224 Banks were opposed to this at first,
because it was perceived as possible competition225 Although soon after
the approval, banks came to understand that the Postal Savings System
captured a considerable amount of money out of consumer pockets.226
Therefore, it brought broad benefits by incurring funds that would not
have been deposited at banks otherwise.227 Mainstream financial services
would likely have a similar response today.228
Deposits at the Postal Savings Systems were discontinued in 1967
because banks and other financial institutions raised their interest rates,
which led to mass transition to private deposits.229 However, the USPS
still serves the financial interest of some consumers by issuing money
orders as well as prepaid debit cards through American Express.230
There will be a positive effect from returning postal banking to
the United States at this juncture due to the fair lending needs of the unbanked and underbanked population.231 Further, the at-risk population
would be apt to take action and join this financial service more so than
other alternatives.232 Seventy-seven percent of those who use alternative

220. Marans, supra note 211.
221. U.S. POSTAL SERV., Postal Savings System (July 2008), http://about.usps.com/who-

we-are/postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. U.S. POSTAL SERV., Postal Savings System (July 2008), http://about.usps.com/whowe-are/postal-history/postal-savings-system.pdf.
227. Id.
228. See Joyce, supra note 77 (stating that Bank of America closed their free checking
accounts that were attracting low-income consumers).
229. U.S. POSTAL SERV., supra note 221.
230. Dayen, supra note 213.
231. Dayen, supra note 213.
232. Dayen, supra note 213.

2019]

BANKING AT THE FED

475

financial services have a favorable view of the customer service offered
at their local USPS.233
Instead of banks partnering with predatory lenders, banks could
partner with the USPS.234 There are five potential products for postal
banking to offer: postal cards, interest-bearing savings accounts, smalldollar loans, debit cards, and checking accounts.235 Debit cards and
checking accounts should have little pushback from the consumer banking system since this service would likely reach consumers who are not
part of the current system.236 The interest-bearing savings account could
be at a competitive rate, but not necessarily the IOR rate.237 Therefore,
this would encourage banks to offer fair rates or exit this market in general if they do not find these customers to be favorable clients.238
The more aspirational aspect of the postal banking proposal from
Senator Gillibrand that could receive some pushback from fringe banking
businesses would be the small dollar loan services.239 This unbanked and
underbanked population currently needs small dollar loan services the
FedAccounts proposal does not offer.240 Therefore it is essential for
postal banking to offer this aspect of the service even if it puts pressure
on the payday lending community.241

233. U.S. POSTAL SERV., The Road Ahead for Postal Financial Services (May 21, 2015),
https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/document-library-files/2015/rarc-wp-15011_0.pdf.
234. See Jessica Silver-Greenburg, Major Banks Aid in Payday Loans Banned by States,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/24/business/major-banksaid-in-payday-loans-banned-by-states.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=1697D95EF5C150E4FC9755671AA6335A&gwt=pay
(discussing the benefit banks are receiving from supporting online payday lenders).
235. INSPECTOR GENERAL USPS REPORT, supra note 72.
236. See Weissman, supra note 210 (stating that it would be able to relieve the millions of
householders without banking services without much pushback from the current banking system).
237. INSPECTOR GENERAL USPS REPORT, supra note 72.
238. See Weissman, supra note 210 (discussing the idea that Gillibrand’s lending proposal
is ambitious and the suggested interest rate is likely too low for the high risks of default).
239. Weissman, supra note 210.
240. See Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11 (stating that FedAccounts would
not offer a lending remedy).
241. See Abby Vesoulis, Millions of American Can’t Afford a Checking Account. The Post
Office Could Fix That, TIME (Aug. 7, 2018), http://time.com/5351706/postal-banking-kirstengillibrand/ (stating the large difference between the rate that the Gillibrand bill proposes and
the suggested interest rate by the Inspector General).
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The bill suggests interest rates on credit in line with the Department of Treasury’s one-month constant maturity rate, currently under
2%.242 However, the USPS Inspector General suggests interest rates on
the loans at a much higher rate of 25%.243 There will have to be a negotiation on this rate to either raise it or make it flexible depending on the
borrower before the bill passes.244 The suggested rate of 2% is likely too
low to extend loans in the circumstances of the unbanked and underbanked population.245
Additionally, there is the risk that the population that the USPS
intends to service with these loans are more likely to default.246 However,
the USPS can enlist the services of the Internal Revenue Service and other
federal agencies that have the power to garnish wages or tax returns, an
ability that payday lenders do not have and therefore charge for the perceived high-risk lending.247
Ultimately, a smaller loan service offering either of these interest
rates would likely be overly competitive for current payday lenders and
put financial strain on their business.248 Senator Gillibrand249 suggests
that the only legislator that would oppose her proposal would be one who
will want to protect payday lender profits.250 However, there is likely a
significant group that will want to protect payday lenders.251 The payday
lending industry has made $14 million in total political contributions
since 2010.252 Nevertheless, Baradaran suggests that USPS has the

242.
243.
244.
245.

Weissman, supra note 210.
INSPECTOR GENERAL USPS REPORT, supra note 72.
Vesoulis, supra note 241.
See John Caskey, Reaching Out to the Unbanked, in INCLUSION IN THE AMERICAN
DREAM: ASSETS, POVERTY, AND PUBLIC POLICY (M.W. Sherraden ed., 2005) (explaining that
loaning to the unbanked is not always ideal and may put these consumers in a worse off financial situation if it continues).
246. See Weissman, supra note 210 (discussing the idea that Gillibrand’s lending proposal
is ambitious, and the suggested interest rate is likely too low for the high risks of default).
247. Baradaran, supra note 8.
248. See Weissman, supra note 210.
249. Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.).
250. See Weissman, supra note 210.
251. See Payday Lenders: Long-Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG CTR. FOR
RESPONSIVE
POL.,
https://www.opensecrets.org/industries/totals.php?cycle=2018&ind=F1420 (last visited Jan. 30, 2019) (highlighting the consistent political contributions payday lenders have given over the last decade).
252. Id.
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ability and legal authority to expand its sources of revenue without additional action from Congress, making action possible without the bill passing.253
Lastly, this system could be of assistance to USPS.254 The USPS
is the United States’ second-largest employer and is self-funded without
taxpayer support,255 but despite these figures the service is currently financially strained.256 International post offices have obtained substantial
revenue by offering financial services.257 This market opportunity could
add $8.9 billion per year to USPS.258 Further, the plan would essentially
be cost-free to the taxpayer.259 This plan provides services for the population at risk while co-existing with private financial institutions.260
B.

State Public Banks

State public banks are financial institutions that allow state or city
borrowing to be controlled by the state government.261 Instead of paying
a private institution to hold the public’s money, the state would own the
banking institution.262 This process claims to not only save on banking
fees but also focus on investing the public banks’ profits back into the
community.263
State public banks might also offer opportunities that the Federal
Reserve and FedAccounts will not.264 When surveyed, the unbanked and
underbanked population listed their number one reason for not having a

253. Baradaran, supra note 8.
254. Id.
255. Ellen Brown, The War on the Post Office, CAMPAIGN FOR POSTAL BANKING (Mar. 16,

2018), http://www.campaignforpostalbanking.org/news/the-war-on-the-post-office/.
256. Id.
257. INSPECTOR GENERAL USPS REPORT, supra note 72.
258. INSPECTOR GENERAL USPS REPORT, supra note 72.
259. Baradaran, supra note 8.
260. Baradaran, supra note 8.
261. Irina Ivanova, Will Los Angeles Create A City-Owned Bank? Voters to Decide, CBS
NEWS (Nov. 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-los-angeles-create-a-city-ownedbank-voters-will-decide/.
262. Id.
263. See id. (explaining the possible benefits if Los Angeles approves a city owned bank).
264. See Eric Hardmeyer, Why Public Banking Works in North Dakota, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
1, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/10/01/should-states-operate-publicbanks/why-public-banking-works-in-north-dakota.

478

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 23

bank account as “I don’t like dealing with banks.”265 However, state public banks have the opportunity to change this response from consumers
by delivering the trust and client specific services needed by their localized population.
The Federal Reserve has the reputation of being a large, distant
government organization with which consumers—especially the unbanked and underbanked population—have very little familiarity.266 A
state-run bank offering these services customized to the state’s consumer
needs may well establish direct, customized contact with these customers
that are typically uncomfortable dealing with traditional banks.267 Staterun banks would be known for providing specific services for these
groups.268
The Bank of North Dakota, which has operated and managed
public funds for nearly 100 years, serves as an example of a successful
state-run bank operation.269 The Bank of North Dakota was founded in
1919 to create reliable access to affordable credit for the state’s farmers
and businesses and is the nation’s only state-run bank.270 The bank currently makes low-interest loans to students, smalls businesses, and
startups.271 The Bank of North Dakota claims it “is successful because
[they] are partners with North Dakota’s financial institutions, not competitors.”272 This partnership works by state public banks making loans
that a private institution might find less profitable.273 In the last ten years,
the bank has transferred nearly $300 million in profits to the North Dakota treasury.274

265. Caskey, supra note 245.
266. Hardmeyer, supra note 264.
267. See Caskey, supra note 10 (interpreting the change that banks would have to make to

convince the unbanked population to stop using fringe banking).
268. Caskey, supra note 10.
269. See PUBLIC BANKING INSTITUTE, INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC BANKING,
http://www.publicbankinginstitute.org (discussing the Bank of North Dakota and the history
of Public Banking in the United States).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Hardmeyer, supra note 264.
273. Ivanova, supra note 261.
274. Bank of North Dakota: America’s Only ‘Socialist’ bank is Thriving During Downturn, HUFFINGTON POST, (May 25, 2011), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/02/16/bankof-north-dakotasocia_n_463522.html.

2019]

BANKING AT THE FED

479

The success of the Bank of North Dakota has inspired an ongoing
campaign to create the Public Bank of New York City.275 The idea is that
it would serve as a fully functional bank owned and operated by the city
by serving as a “public trust invested in social justice, accountable to the
public.”276 The city’s taxes, fees, and local revenue are currently held in
corporate bank accounts.277 Therefore, the banks that hold these deposit
accounts can dictate the lending and interest rates.278
The Public Bank NYC Coalition calls for a transition of power
with a publicly operated financial institution supported by the belief that
“public money should work for the public good.”279 The coalition lists
the goals of the NYC public bank as making equitable investments, cooperative community development, affordable financial services, and accountability.280
New York City is not the only area calling for a public bank.281
The state of Washington passed a bill earlier in 2018 to create a public
bank.282 Several California cities are doing feasibility studies with Los
Angeles having a set back on their localized bank by putting it to a recent
unsuccessful popular vote.283 Although not yet popular, state public
banks are gaining attention within the United States as an alternative for
public banking.284
State public banks could start reaching out to this part of the population by providing check cashing services even to those who do not
hold an account.285 The unbanked and underbanked population are likely
to be slow to transition into the system by opening deposit accounts due
to little month-to-month savings, welfare ineligibility, or the risk of

275. Michelle Chen, How a Public Bank Could Help You, THE NATION (July 5, 2018),
https://www.thenation.com/article/public-bank-help.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. See PUBLIC BANK NYC, MISSION AND VISION,
https://www.publicbanknyc.org/about, (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) (reviewing the reason New York citizens are calling
for a state bank and what services and policies the proposed bank plans to have).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Ivanova, supra note 261.
282. Ivanova, supra note 261.
283. Ivanova, supra note 261.
284. Ivanova, supra note 261.
285. Caskey, supra note 10.
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creditor access.286 Getting consumers involved in a state public bank
through low-dollar check cashing without needing accounts allows them
to become part of the banking process by gradually integrating them into
the banking system.287 State-run banks could even go one step further
and encourage these depositors to build savings and even establish investment accounts.288
State-run banks could also be of assistance to consumers in the
short term through small-dollar lending.289 Currently, this is not an attractive area of the market for banks to enter because the processing and
monitoring costs are high when compared to the small amount of the
loan.290 However, state banks partnering with a philanthropic foundation
specific to their community could arrange collateral for this high-risk,
low profit lending.291 The organization could raise money through its
foundation and place these funds at the state bank.292 By applying
through the organization, consumers could gain access to short-term,
small-dollar loans by using the organization’s deposit as collateral.293
This would serve as a community check on lending services while providing emergency small-dollar loans to those consumers who need them.294
FedAccounts do not initiate this same partnership approach as
state-run banks, but instead create tension between the Federal Reserve
and commercial banking institutions.295 Further, this program cannot
help this part of the population if they are not able to get them to establish
a FedAccount.296
Rather than allow the Federal Reserve to act on such a significant
scale, state banks could serve the public and work compatibly with

286.
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Caskey, supra note 10.
Caskey, supra note 10.
Caskey, supra note 10.
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See Caskey, supra note 10 (interpreting the change that banks would have to make to
convince the unbanked population to stop using fringe banking).
292. Caskey, supra note 10.
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294. Caskey, supra note 10.
295. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
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private financial institutions instead of creating a program to reduce their
size and ability to function.297
C.

Mobile Financial Services

Another route to engaging the unbanked and underbanked population and encouraging universal financial service access is through mobile financial services.298 Mobile phones have become a standard for
Americans in the last decade.299 This technological advancement led to
an increase in the accessibility of banking services through innovative
financial service technologies.300 Banks could add $380 billion annually
in revenue by reaching out to the unbanked and underbanked population.301 Because of the opportunity in the market, banks that do not start
to make this transition into the market will be pressed to compete with
the outside competition from technology companies.302
The FedAccounts proposal notes that—although other countries
have had success—the United States should not be willing to wait on the
technology.303 Although this would likely take some time, mobile banking access does not seem far from reaching every corner of society.304
Thanks to lower transaction costs, mobile banking would enable banks to
reach this part of the population cost-effectively.305

297. Caskey, supra note 10.
298. See GEMALTO, BRINGING FINANCIAL SERVICES TO THE UNBANKED, https://www.ge-

malto.com/review/pages/bringing-financial-services-to-the-unbanked.aspx (last visited Feb.
6, 2019), (describing the African population’s use of mobile phones is bringing them access
to financial services even without a traditional bank account).
299. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, INTERNET & TECHNOLOGY, MOBILE FACT SHEET (Feb. 5,
2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheet/mobile/.
300. GEMALTO, supra note 300
301. See Banks Can Grow Profitably in Emerging Economies by Being More Inclusive,
ACCENTURE CARE https://www.accenture.com/us-en/insight-banks-grow-profitably-emerging-economies (overviewing a plan to use inclusive banking services to reach out to the unbanked population) [hereinafter ACCENTURE REPORT].
302. See Macarena Munoz Montijano, BBVA Plans New Management Revamp as Chairman Pushes Digital Bank, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 28, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-07-28/bbva-plans-new-management-revamp-as-chairman-pushes-digital-bank
(reporting on Spain’s biggest lender’s push into digital banking).
303. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
304. ACCENTURE REPORT, supra note 303.
305. ACCENTURE REPORT, supra note 303.
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Sixty-three percent of unbanked consumers have a mobile phone,
and 91% of underbanked consumers have a mobile phone.306 Further,
underbanked households are more likely than their unbanked and fully
banked counterparts to have smartphones.307
Kenya serves as a successful example of the benefit that mobile
payment systems can have on the inclusion of underserved banking consumers.308 Sixty percent of Kenyan adults over the age of fifteen use
mobile payments to send money.309 M-PESA, a Kenyan mobile phonebased money transfer and financing company, uses simple text messaging
to allow people to transfer money.310 In India, mobile financial services
extend financial access to approximately 43% of the unbanked population.311
There are currently partnerships with technology companies and
banking institutions to create financial products to reach the unbanked
and underbanked.312 For example, PayPal is planning to offer consumer
debit cards connected to PayPal accounts that would offer direct deposit
along with other services.313 The fees are small for ATM withdrawals
and check deposits, and the service does not require monthly fees or minimum balances.314 Amazon is also exploring the option of getting involved in banking services.315

306. Aaron Smith, Smartphone Adoption and Usage, WASHINGTON: PEW RESEARCH
CENTER, http:// pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP_Smartphones.pdf (2011);
Javelin Strategy and Research (2011), Mobile Banking, Smartphone and Tablet Forecast:
Mobile Banking Moves Mainstream to Mid-Sized, Community Banks, and Credit Unions,
Pleasanton, CA: Javelin Strategy and Research (2011-2016).
307. See id. (underbanked households with mobile phones, 57 percent have smart-phones
compared with 26 percent of unbanked and 44 percent of fully banked households).
308. Id.
309. Asli Demirguc-Kuntand Leora Klapper, Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global
Findex Data- base, (Washington: World Bank Research Working Paper 6025, 2012).
310. Alan McIntyre, Banks Need to Focus on a New Customer- The Unbanked, FORBES
(May 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alanmcintyre/2017/05/10/banks-need-to-focus-on-a-new-customer-the-unbanked/#365a6f0059c8.
311. Dhananjay Mahapatra, Airtel, Axis Bank Join Hands for Mobile Banking, TIMES OF
INDIA (Apr. 18, 2018), www.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/AirtelAxis-Bank-join-hands-for-mobile-banking/ pmarticleshow/13174195.cms?prtpage=1.
312. Sarah Perez, PayPal to Roll Out Banking Products for the ‘Unbanked’ in the Weeks
Ahead, TECH CRUNCH, https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/09/paypal-to-roll-out-banking-products-for-the-unbanked-in-the-weeks-ahead/.
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Further, large technology firms, such as PayPal and Amazon,
have formed lobbying groups to discuss “issues on mobile payment and
payment processing” relating to underserved consumers.316 These groups
are engaging in more than just payment processing and have started offering lending services.317 For example, Apple offers loans for iPhones,
and Amazon conducts small-business lending.318 Both of these services
have grown rapidly since their introduction to the market.319
If mainstream financial institutions are not willing to reach out to
unbanked and underbanked consumers because of a lack of profitability,
there is a sector in the private market that is trying to find a way to reach
this part of the population.320 However, if there is a lack in profitability
for whole or parts of this sector, mobile financial services will likely have
to partner with government efforts such as postal banking or state banks
to serve this part of the population adequately.321
V. CONCLUSION
FedAcccounts would undoubtedly bring about substantial financial change to the United States economy.322 However, it is questionable
how much of this change would be for the good of the economy.323 FedAccounts will likely not be inclusive of the unbanked and underbanked
population and lacks the lending aspect of the financial services that this
part of the populations needs most.324 Regardless of the strategy used to
reach this part of the population, it is vital that it small-dollar lending be
provided for the unbanked and underbanked population.325

316. Lalita Clozel, Why are Amazon, PayPal Meeting with Bank Regulators, AM. BANKER,
Sep. 29, 2017, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/why-are-amazon-paypal-meetingwith-bank-regulators.
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potential).
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322. Ricks, Crawford & Menand, supra note 6, at 11.
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FedAccounts will also introduce a large amount of government
intervention into the private banking sector, which would likely slow economic growth and development.326 Finally, unlike other alternatives to
reach the unbanked and underbanked population, FedAccounts would
work against mainstream financial institutions.327 These alternatives,
such as postal banking, state banks, and mobile financial services, will
have less drastic effects and better serve consumers.328
FedAccounts, while nobly attempting financial inclusion, are not
the best solution to meet this end in the United States economy.329 Policymakers should strive to find and create a solution that works harmoniously with the current private sector while still offering assistance.330 Although the unbanked and underbanked are challenging to reach,
innovative strategies show promise to reach this part of the population.331

What is certain is that this part of the population cannot be left out of
mainstream financial services any longer.332
E. KYLIE NORMAN*
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